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Abstract 
Group communication can benefit from Internet Protocol (IP) 
multicast protocol to achieve efficient exchange of messages. 
However, IP multicast does not provide any mechanisms for 
authentication. In literature, many solutions to solve this 
problem were presented. It has been shown that Wong and Lam 
protocol is the only protocol that can resist both packet loss and 
pollution attacks. In contrast, it has high computation and 
communication overheads. In the present paper, an efficient 
design for the implementation of Wong and Lam multicast 
authentication protocol is proposed. In order to solve the 
computation overhead problem, we use two-levels of 
parallelism. To reduce the communication overhead, we use 
Universal Message Authentication Codes (UMAC) instead of 
hash functions. The design is analyzed for both NTRU and 
elliptic curve cryptography signature algorithms. The analysis 
shows that the proposed design decreases significantly the 
execution time of Wong-Lam protocol which makes it suitable 
for real-time applications. 
Keywords: Group Communication, Multicast Authentication, 
Parallel Processing, Clustering, Message Passing Systems. 
1. Introduction 
Group communication can benefit from Internet Protocol 
(IP) multicast to achieve efficient exchange of messages. 
IP multicast is a bandwidth-conserving technology that 
reduces traffic by simultaneously delivering a single 
stream of information to thousands of recipients [1]. 
Applications that take advantage of multicast 
communication include: video conferencing, distance 
learning, corporate communications, distribution of 
software, stock quotes and news. Concerning the security 
of IP multicast, it has two major drawbacks: first, it does 
not provide any mechanisms for preventing non-group 
members to have access to the group communication, 
which is known as the group confidentiality problem. 
Second, it does not provide any mechanisms to provide 
authentication of the sender, which is known as multicast 
authentication problem. In the present paper, we 
concentrate only on the multicast authentication problem. 
For the group confidentiality problem, the reader could 
refer to [2-13]. 
 
The multicast authentication is a serious problem. 
Authenticity means that the recipient could verify the 
identity of the sender and ensures that the received 
message comes from the supposed originator. The 
solutions of group confidentiality problem are based on 
the fact that all group members share one symmetric key. 
In case of any member change, the group key must be 
modified by a group controller and sent securely to the 
whole group members. A crucial need is to provide 
authentication for messages received after a key change. 
For multicast communication, authentication is a 
challenging problem, since it requires the verification of 
data originator by a large number of recipients. Assume a 
group containing n members. A naïve solution is to use a 
shared symmetric key between the sender and each 
recipient to calculate different Message Authentication 
Codes (MACs). Then, the sender appends the calculated 
MACs to the group message. Upon receiving the 
message, each recipient ensures the authenticity of the 
message using the MAC calculated by the key shared 
between it and the sender. This solution has a high 
communication overhead since in order to ensure the 
authenticity of a message n MACs must be appended to 
it. Another solution is to use the private key of the sender 
to sign a hash of the entire message. This solution suffers 
from the high computation and communication overheads 
since the signature algorithms require large computation 
and produce large output signatures. The 
abovementioned solutions do not resist packet loss, since 
the loss of any packet of the message will cause the 
inability to authenticate the received packets. This is due 
to the fact that the MAC or the signatures are calculated 
over the whole message. Many multicast applications are 
running over IP networks, in which several packet losses 
could occur. To solve this problem, the receiver can 
request retransmission of the lost packets. In multicast 
 communication, different receivers lose different sets of 
packets, thus retransmission can overload the resources 
of both the sender and the network. Therefore, multicast 
authentication protocols must resist packet loss. In order 
to resist packet loss, one solution is to calculate MAC or 
signature for every packet. This solution will suffer from 
a huge amount of communication and computation 
overheads. In literature, two solutions for providing 
multicast authentication were proposed: the first is to 
design more efficient signature schemes. The latter is to 
amortize signature over several packets. 
 
In literature, it has been shown that Wong and Lam 
protocol has several advantages over the other multicast 
authentication protocols. It is the only protocol that can 
resist both packet loss and pollution attacks under any 
circumstances. Also, it has no delay at the receiver, since 
it could authenticate each packet upon receiving it. 
Therefore, it is suitable for real-time applications. On the 
other hand, it has high computation and communication 
overheads. In the present paper, an efficient design for 
the implementation of Wong and Lam multicast 
authentication protocol is proposed. In order to solve the 
computation overhead problem, we use two-levels of 
parallelism. To reduce the communication overhead, we 
use Universal Message Authentication Codes (UMAC) 
instead of hash functions. UMAC algorithm can achieve 
the same security level as hash functions with lower 
output length. Other solution to reduce the 
communication overhead is to use a signature algorithm 
with a lower output length (e.g. elliptic curve 
cryptography which has a lower output length compared 
to NTRU and RSA for the same security level). 
Therefore, lower communication overhead could be 
achieved. The design is analyzed for both NTRU and 
elliptic curve cryptography signature algorithms, and for 
different values of message size. The analysis shows that 
the use of parallel systems decreases significantly the 
execution time of Wong-Lam protocol which makes the 
proposed design suitable for real-time applications. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, a survey 
of multicast authentication is detailed. In Section 3, an 
overview of multiprocessor schemes is given. Then, the 
proposed design is detailed in Section 4. In Section 5, 
discussion of results is given. Finally, the paper 
concludes in Section 6. 
 
2. Survey of Multicast Authentication 
Protocols 
For multicast communication, authentication is a 
challenging problem, since it requires that a large number 
of recipients must verify the data originator. According to 
Wong and Lam [14] and Pannetrat and Molva [15], 
multicast authentication protocols have several 
requirements that are summarized below: 
- Delay at sender and receiver: flows that is 
real-time in nature need fast processing at 
sender as well as at receiver. 
- Buffering resources: the number of packets 
that have to be stored at both the sender and the 
receiver in order to carry out the authentication 
process. 
- Robustness: the ability of the recipient to 
authenticate the received packet, even in case of 
losses in the network (since many of multicast 
applications are running over IP networks, in 
which several packet losses could occur). 
- Resistance to packet loss: the ability of the 
recipient to start authentication at any arbitrary 
point in the flow. 
- Resistance to pollution attacks: the ability of 
the recipient to distinguish between 
authenticated packets and modified packets. 
- Latency: the maximum number of packets that 
need to be received before a packet can be 
authenticated. 
- Computational cost: the computational cost of 
the protocol. 
- Communication cost: the number of bytes per 
packets that need to be appended in order to 
provide multicast authentication. 
 
To solve the multicast authentication problem, two 
approaches have been proposed: design more efficient 
signature schemes and amortize the cost of signature over 
several packets. For the first approach, efficient digital 
signature schemes have been proposed in [14-18]. 
Although these schemes overcome the computational 
problem, they suffer from the communication overhead 
problem, which makes them impractical for real-time 
applications. Another solution is to amortize signature 
over several packets as proposed in [14, 19 and 20]. 
Early work was done by Gennaro and Rohatgi [19]. The 
stream is divided into blocks of m packets and a chain of 
hashes is used to link each packet to the one preceding it. 
Then only the last packet is signed. Although this 
approach solves the computation and communication 
overheads problem, it has a major drawback that is, in 
case of any packet loss, the authentication chain is 
broken and subsequent packets cannot be authenticated. 
Many of multicast applications are running over IP 
networks where several packet losses could occur. 
Therefore, multicast authentication protocols must resist 
packet loss. In [20], Golle and Modadugu solve this 
problem by appending the hash of a packet into two 
places: the first is in the next packet and the second is in 
the packet succeeding by "a" places and only the final 
packet is signed. Their solution is based on the property 
that loss over the Internet occurs in bursts as stated in 
 [21] and can resist several bursts of a certain number of 
packets. Other enhancements to the basic scheme were 
proposed in order to resist a larger burst. Although they 
solve the problem of loss over networks, it is not clearly 
stated how the packet containing signature is sent. The 
lost of the signature packet requires its retransmission 
several times. In multicast communication, different 
receivers lose different sets of packets, thus 
retransmission can overload the resources of both the 
sender and the network. Furthermore, the communication 
overhead will increase. 
 
Wong and Lam proposed in [14] another solution to 
solve the problem of packet loss. In their proposal, the 
stream is divided into blocks of n packets (Pac1, Pac2, 
Pac3…, Pacn-2, Pacn-1, Pacn) and a tree of hashes of 
degree 2 is constructed as shown in Figure 1. The hashes 
of the n packets correspond to the leaves of the tree and 
only the root of the tree needs to be signed. Each parent 
corresponds to the hash of its children. For example H1-2 
= hash of (H1 and H2). Fig. 1 shows the tree construction 
for a block containing eight packets. In order to 
authenticate any packet, the siblings of each node along 
its path to the root and the packet signature must be 
appended. For example, to authenticate P5, the following 
sequence must be received: P5, H6, H7-8, H1-4, H1-8 and 
signature on H1-8. The receiver calculates H'5-6 using H5 
and H6. Then, it calculates H’5-8 using H’5-6 and H7-8. 
Finally, it calculates H’1-8 using H’5-8 and H1-4 and checks 
that H’1-8 equals H1-8 using the received signature.  If the 
check is correct, the received packet will be 
authenticated. Since each packet carries the information 
required for its authentication; therefore, any packet loss 
will not affect the ability of the receiver to authenticate 
packets arrived after the loss. On the other hand, this 
solution suffers from a high communication overhead, 
since it requires the appending of log2(n)+1 hashes to 
each packet. 
 
Perrig et al. proposed in [22-25] efficient solutions for 
the authentication problem named Timed for Efficient 
Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) and 
Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS). 
TESLA is based on authenticating packets using MACs 
and revealing the MAC keys after a certain time interval. 
Although these solutions have low communication and 
computation overheads, they have a major drawback that 
they require that the sender and the receivers maintain the 
synchronization of their clocks. Furthermore, these 
solution suffer from the several sent of signature packet 
in case of packet loss. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Tree chaining of the Wong and Lam scheme. 
 
In [15 and 28], a solution was proposed to solve to the 
problem of multiple sent of signature packet and packet 
loss using erasure codes. Erasure codes [25-27] allow the 
receiver to restore the original data under the condition 
that the loss rate does not exceed a certain value. 
However, erasure codes can resist only one threat model: 
packet loss. Erasure codes assume that packets are only 
lost but not corrupted in transit. Unfortunately, in real 
environments, packets could be lost, modified, delayed 
and dropped. These threats are defined in [29] as 
pollution attacks. In [29], Karlof et al. propose a solution 
to pollution attacks. In their solution, which is based on 
the solution given in [28], each symbol output of the 
erasure code is augmented by additional information – 
witness information - to differentiate between legitimate 
symbols and invalid symbols. To obtain witness 
information, Merkle hash tree is constructed where 
symbols output of the erasure code are considered as 
leaves of the tree. Then, each symbol is augmented by the 
siblings along its path to the root. This information is 
used to partition symbols as valid or invalid. Then, only 
valid symbols are used to restore the original packet 
hashes and the corresponding signature. While this 
proposal overcomes the pollution attack problem, it has a 
large communication overhead compared to the 
abovementioned multicast authentication protocols. In 
[30 and 31], other solutions to pollution attacks were 
proposed. They use both public key signature and MAC 
functions, MAC could have an output that is smaller than 
that of hash functions [32]. To amortize signature over 
several packets and resist packet loss, it uses erasure 
codes. On the other hand, to resist pollution attacks, it 
uses symmetric key encryption to calculate the witness 
information instead of the calculation of Merkle hash tree 
as in [29]. The use of symmetric encryption will lower 
the communication overhead compared to [29]. In the 
next section, a background of multiprocessor systems is 
detailed. 
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 3. Why Parallelism? 
 
Many today’s advanced research problems need greater 
computing power at high speeds. Most of these 
applications are real-time applications which require 
yielding results at specific deadlines during actual 
implementation. Parallel systems, which emphasize 
parallel processing, are the most favorable architectures 
to increase the computing power and achieve speedup. 
Parallel processing continues to hold the promise of the 
solution of more complex problems, by connecting a 
number of powerful processors together into a single 
system. These connected processors cooperate to solve a 
single problem that exceeds the ability of any one of the 
processors [33]. Depending on how the memory is 
shared, there exist two models of parallel systems, shared 
memory systems (tightly coupled) and distributed 
memory systems (loosely coupled). Shared Memory 
(SM) systems use a common memory shared by various 
processors and have a centralized control. This primate 
shared memory access and the involved processors have 
overlapping primary address space, which means that one 
processor can directly access any other processor data. A 
Distributed Memory (DM) system, involves connecting 
multiple independent nodes each contains a processor 
and its local memory. There is no sharing of primary 
memory, but each processor has its own memory. The 
contents of each memory can only be accessed by its 
processor. When a processor needs information owned 
by another processor, the information is sent as a 
message from one processor to the other. Messages can 
carry information between nodes and also 
synchronization node activities. There are no restrictions 
on the number of available processors [33]. DM systems 
have some advantages over SM systems: First, in DM 
systems, as the number of processors increases, the 
memory size increases, while in SM systems, the memory 
size does not increase. Second, as the number of 
processors in DM systems increases, the total memory 
bandwidth increases, while in SM systems, the total 
memory bandwidth remains constant, independent of the 
number of processors. Third, as the number of processors 
in DM system increases, processing capability of the 
system increases. In SM systems, addition of more 
processors causes memory bottleneck, which decreases 
processing capability of the system. Also, the number of 
stages in the network increases with the number of 
processors. Thus, even if sufficient memory bandwidth 
can be provided, the minimum network latency increases 
with the number of processors. Finally, the 
synchronization among processors is required for 
building scalable parallel computer systems. 
Synchronization prevents processors from reading results 
from the memory before other processors write them to 
the memory. In DM systems, the transmission and 
reception of messages enforces implicit synchronization 
among the processors. SM systems require extra support 
for providing a global shared memory mapped onto the 
set of distributed local memories [33, 34, 35, 36 and 37]. 
For the above reasons, the parallel systems based on 
distributed memory are chosen for our research. 
 
 
Extraordinary improvements over the past few years in 
microprocessors, memory, buses, networks and software 
have made possible the collection of groups of 
inexpensive personal computers and workstations that in 
concert have processing power rivaling supercomputers. 
A cluster is a group of independent nodes which forms a 
loosely coupled multiprocessor system. Multi–cluster 
systems enable cost–effective mapping of parallel 
program tasks into computing hardware. It results 
primarily from distribution of computing power of a 
system to parallel programs decomposed into groups of 
cooperating tasks. The distribution of tasks among 
clusters improves efficiency of a system due to processor 
load balancing and better control of the use of 
communication resources. As a result, cluster computing 
has recently become a domain of intensive research 
supported by many practical implementations. In 
commercially available multi–cluster systems, a cluster 
contains a set of processors that communicate in most 
cases through shared memory as shown in Figure 2. 
Mutual communication among clusters is done by an 
additional communication network. The standard feature 
is that internal and external cluster communication is 
implemented using different hardware which leads to the 
existence of different latencies. The internal latency is 
generally much lower than that of external 
communication. However, another common feature is 
that the internal cluster communication latency is very 
sensitive to the cluster size. This is especially visible 
when communication is based on shared memory where 
the impeding elements can be a memory bus or single 
access memory modules [38 and 39]. Therefore, multi-
cluster systems combine the advantages of both shared 
memory and message passing systems. In our work we 
use multi-cluster system to solve the problem of internal 
communication. In the next section, description of the 
proposed design is given. 
  
(a) Individual cluster 
 
 
(b) Multi-cluster system 
 
Fig. 2  A Multi-cluster system configuration. 
 
4. Efficient Design for the Implementation  
of Wong-Lam Multicast Authentication  
Protocol Using Two-Levels of Parallelism 
 
In literature, it has been shown that Wong and Lam 
protocol has several advantages over the other multicast 
authentication protocols. It is the only protocol that can 
resist both packet loss and pollution attacks under any 
circumstances. Also, it has no delay at the receiver, since 
it could authenticate each packet upon receiving it. 
Therefore, it is suitable for real-time applications. On the 
other hand, it has high computation and communication 
overheads. In order to solve the computation overhead 
problem, we use two-levels of parallelism. To reduce the 
communication overhead, we use Universal Message 
Authentication Codes (UMAC). UMAC algorithm can 
achieve the same security level as hash functions with 
lower output length [32]. Therefore, lower 
communication overhead could be achieved. Other 
solution to reduce the communication overhead is to use 
a signature algorithm with a lower output length (e.g. 
elliptic curve cryptography which has a lower output 
length compared to NTRU and RSA for the same 
security level). In our work, we assume that the data 
stream is divided into ‘G’ groups of packets each group 
contains ‘n’ packets and constructed a tree similar to 
Figure 1. For the first level of parallelism (coarse grained 
parallelism), every group of packets is processed in 
parallel. For ‘M’ processors message passing system, 
there are three cases: 
(i) M > G: one group of packets is assigned to each 
processor from ‘Po‘ to ‘PG-1‘ and the other ‘M-G’ 
processors will be idle.  
(ii) M = G: one group of packets is assigned to each 
processor. 
(iii) M < G, we assign 
M
G  groups of packets to each 
processor, and the remaining 
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For the first and the third cases, load unbalance may 
occur. One solution to this problem is to balance the load 
between processors. This arises the need to divide the 
group of packets into parts (second level of parallelism - 
medium grained parallelism). Therefore, more than one 
processor cooperate to execute the tree hashes. In case of 
using message passing systems, the communication 
overhead will increase due to the need to exchange large 
messages. Using a cluster of processors will solve this 
problem because more than one processor can share the 
same memory which results in decreasing the 
communication overhead. In our work, we assume a 
multi-cluster system containing ‘m’ clusters, where each 
cluster contains ‘k’ processors. Each cluster computes 
m
G  group of packets, and the remaining 
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clusters. Therefore, the maximum number of assigned 
groups to a cluster ‘Nmax‘ is 
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G . Nmax groups will be 
executed by ‘k’ processors. Each processor computes 
k
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 groups of packets will be executed 
by the cluster’s processors. In order to describe our 
proposed design, the following parameters are used: 
  
Lenpac :packet length (bits) 
G :number of groups of packets 
InLenUMAC :UMAC input length (bits) 
OutLenUMAC :UMAC output length (bits) 
ThUMAC :UMAC algorithm throughput 
 (signatures/sec) 
ThSig :signature throughput (signatures/sec) 
Ts :total sequential time (msec) 
Tcomp :computation time (msec) 
Tov :overhead time (msec) 
Tpar :parallel time/execution time (msec) 
 
External network 
C2 Cm Cn-1 ……….
……..….
. 
C1 
Cluster  Ci 
 
Shared memory 
nodes 
P0 Pj Pk-1 ……. ……. 
 To calculate the computation time for one group of 
packets ‘TG’, the following equation is used: 
 
3T2T1TGT       (1) 
 
Where: T1 is the time to calculate hashes for the first 
level in the tree and equals to






UMAC
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to calculate hashes for the other levels and equals to 
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InLen*1n  and T3 is the signature time and 
equals to 





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

SigTh
1 . Using Eq. (1), one can calculate Ts 
which will be equal to  GT*G . To calculate ‘Tpar’, the 
following equation is used:  
 
ovcomppar TTT      (2) 
 
Where 
 
  icompcomp PTmaxT            1-Mi0   (3) 
 
and Tov can be computed using the following equation: 
 
appgcov TTTT     (4) 
 
Where: Tc  is the local communication overhead, which is 
the time spent on access memory, memory contention 
and synchronization. Tg is the global communication 
overhead, which is the time spent on inter-processor 
communication and Tapp  is the application overhead 
time, this is the wasted time due to application 
dependency [36 and 40]. In the next section, analysis of 
the proposed design for both NTRU and elliptic curve 
cryptography signature algorithms and different data 
sizes for Wong-Lam multicast authentication protocol is 
detailed. 
 
5. Evaluation and Experimental Results 
The main reason for building parallel computers is to 
achieve higher performance. The proposed protocol is 
evaluated for both NTRU and elliptic curve cryptography 
signature algorithms. In our implementation, we assume 
that, Lenpac is 32 Kbits and the number of packets n is 
1024. In addition, for UMAC the InLenUMAC is 128 bits, 
the OutLenUMAC is 32 bits, ThUMAC is 79.2 Gbps. For 
NTRU, the output length is 1256 bits and Thsig is 4560 
signatures/sec. For elliptic curve cryptography, the output 
length is 384 bits and Thsig is 5140 signatures/sec.  
Figures 3-5 show the analysis of the proposed protocol 
according to several metrics. Many performance metrics 
have been proposed to quantify the parallel systems [35-
37]. Among of them are:  
 Execution time (parallel time) Tpar is referred to the 
total running time of the program. The aim of using 
parallel systems is to decrease the execution time of 
the problem implementation. 
 Speedup Sp, which relates the time taken to solve the 
problem on a single processor machine to the time 
taken to solve the same problem using parallel 
implementation. Sp, of a parallel program running on 
M processors is defined as the ratio Ts/Tpar. The ideal 
parallel system (of M processors) will solve the 
problem M times faster than the serial one (Sp=M) and 
it is said to be linear speedup.  
  Efficiency, Ep, is defined as the ratio Sp/M. Optimum 
computation time, equates to an efficiency of 1 
(100%). To achieve this level of efficiency every 
processor must spent 100% of its time performing 
useful computation. 
 Degree of improvement is the percentage of 
improvement in system performance with respect to 
sequential execution and can be determined by (Ts-
Tpar)/Ts.  
 Finally, Scalability, a parallel system is scalable if its 
performance continues to improve as the size of the 
system (problem sizes as well as the machine size) 
increase.  
 
Figures 3-5 show the system performance: computation 
time, speed up, efficiency and the improvement degree. 
Figure 3 shows the system performance using message 
passing systems for different message size (1.5 Gbits, 3 
Gbits and 5.5 Gbits) where the signature algorithm used is 
NTRU. Figures 4-5 show the system performance using 
clustering for a message size equals to 3 Gbits. While in 
Figure 4, the signature algorithm used is NTRU, in Figure 
5, the signature algorithm used is elliptic curve 
cryptography. From these figures, the following 
observations are noted: 
 From Figures 3-5, it is clear that the use of parallel 
systems decreases significantly the execution time of 
Wong-Lam protocol which makes the proposed 
design suitable for real-time applications. 
 From Figures 3(a), 4(a) and 5(a), it has been shown 
that as the number of processors (clusters) increases, 
the total execution time decreases irrespective of the 
message size. This is true for both message passing 
systems and clustering systems (for both NTRU and 
elliptic curve cryptography signature algorithms). 
This leads to the conclusion that the proposed design 
is scalable. 
 From Figures 3(b), 4(b) and 5(b), as the number of 
processors (clusters) increases, the speedup increases 
for both message passing systems and clustering 
systems. 
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Fig. 3 The system performance: execution time, speed up, efficiency 
and the improvement degree for different message size using message 
passing systems (the signature algorithm used is NTRU). 
0
10
20
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Clusters
E
x
ec
u
ti
o
n
 t
im
e 
m
se
c.
  
C= 2P C=4P
 
(a)  Execution time 
0
10
20
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Clusters
S
p
ee
d
u
p
  
C= 2P C=4P
 
(b) Speedup 
 
0.7
0.9
1.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Number of Clusters
E
ff
ic
ie
n
cy
p
C= 2P C=4P
 (c)  Efficiency 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Numbber of Clusters
Im
p
ro
v
em
en
t 
D
eg
re
e 
%
C=2P C=4P
(d)  Improvement Degree 
 
Fig. 4 The system performance: execution time, speed up, efficiency 
and the improvement degree for different cluster size (the signature 
algorithm used is NTRU and the message size equals to 3 Gbits). 
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Fig. 5 The system performance: execution time, speed up, efficiency 
and the improvement degree for different cluster size (the signature 
algorithm used is elliptic curve cryptography and the message size 
equals to 3 Gbits). 
 Figure 3(c) shows that when using message passing 
systems load unbalance occurs which leads to 
unstable system efficiency. One solution to this 
problem is to balance the load between processors. 
This arises the need to divide the group of packets 
into parts. Therefore, more than one processor 
cooperate to execute the tree hashes. In this case the 
communication overhead will increase due to the need 
to exchange large messages. Consequently, the use of 
load balance will increase the total execution time. As 
a result, we prefer to solve this problem using 
clustering instead of message passing systems with 
load balancing as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
 Figures 3(d), 4(d) and 5(d) show the degree of 
improvement compared to the sequential time. As the 
number of processors (clusters) increases, the 
improvement degree increases irrespective of the 
message size. To obtain a reasonable efficiency, we 
will be satisfied with an improvement degree equals 
to 95%. Since, the increase of number of processors 
will decrease the efficiency.  
 From the experimental results, the use of clustering 
systems enhances the system performance, since it 
solves the problem of load unbalance. Moreover, for 
NTRU signature algorithm, the ideal cluster design is 
a cluster of two processors. This is due to the fact that 
the time of calculating the tree of hashes is twice the 
time needed to calculate the signature. On the other 
hand, for elliptic curve cryptography signature 
algorithm, a cluster of four processors is the optimum 
design since the time of calculating the tree of hashes 
is four times the time needed to calculate the 
signature. 
 
The analysis shows that the use of multiprocessor 
system will enhance the system performance. Increasing 
the number of processors reduces the total execution 
time. Furthermore, using clustering systems solves the 
problem of load unbalance.    
6. Conclusions 
In the present paper, the problem of authenticating 
multicast communication is addressed. Multicast 
applications are generally running over IP multicast 
protocol. IP multicast protocol does not have any 
mechanisms to provide security to transmitted data. The 
main security features that need to be existed in order to 
build a secure system are: confidentiality and 
authentication. In the present paper, we are only 
concerned about authentication problem. Concerning 
multicast authentication, the problems confronting 
providing authentication are detailed. The main attacks 
that could threaten a multicast authentication protocol 
 are: packet loss and pollution attacks. Two approaches 
have been proposed to solve the authenticity problem: 
design more efficient signature schemes and amortize the 
cost of signature over several packets. In literature, it has 
been shown that Wong and Lam protocol has several 
advantages over the other multicast authentication 
protocols. It is the only protocol that can resist both 
packet loss and pollution attacks under any 
circumstances. Also, it has no delay at the receiver, since 
it could authenticate each packet upon receiving it. 
Therefore, it is suitable for real-time applications. On the 
other hand, it has high computation and communication 
overheads. In the present paper, an efficient design for 
the implementation of Wong and Lam multicast 
authentication protocol is proposed. In order to solve the 
computation overhead problem, we use two-levels of 
parallelism. To reduce the communication overhead, we 
use Universal Message Authentication Codes (UMAC) 
instead of hash functions. UMAC algorithm can achieve 
the same security level as hash functions with lower 
output length. Therefore, lower communication overhead 
could be achieved. Other solution to reduce the 
communication overhead is to use a signature algorithm 
with a lower output length (e.g. elliptic curve 
cryptography which has a lower output length compared 
to NTRU and RSA for the same security level). The 
design is analyzed for both NTRU and elliptic curve 
cryptography signature algorithms and for different 
values of message size. The analysis shows that the use 
of parallel systems decreases significantly the execution 
time of Wong-Lam protocol which makes the proposed 
design suitable for real-time applications. 
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